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The global energy mix is being redefined, and with it the power industry’s 
cost structure. In many countries, electricity-pricing systems are being 
revamped so as to guarantee fixed-cost recovery, often by raising the fixed 
charge of two-part tariff (TPT) schemes. However, consumer misperception 
of TPTs threatens to undermine the policy’s outcome and puts the sector’s 
much-needed transformation in jeopardy. We conduct a quasi-experiment 
with data from a major electricity price reform recently implemented in Spain 
and find robust evidence that consumers are failing to distinguish between 
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 The electricity industry is undergoing an unprecedented transformation. The goal of 
addressing global climate change in line with the Paris Agreement has become heavily 
dependent on the electricity sector’s capacity to achieve much higher levels of 
decarbonization. Indeed, renewable electricity generation grew by 6% in 2017 – the highest 
rate among all energy sources – accounting for 25% of global power output; however, in 
order to limit global warming to 1.5°C, renewable electricity will need to reach a global 
share of up to 97% by 2050 (IPCC 2018). Investment in clean energy rose from $88 billion 
USD in 2005 to around $300 billion per year since 2010 (International Energy Agency 
2018), and to host this expanding fleet of renewable generators, a new investment cycle has 
been initiated to increase the capacity of the distribution network (European Commission 
2015). Moreover, this supply of cleaner generation needs to operate in tandem with the 
thriving electrification of energy end use, which implies a greater interconnectedness and 
interdependence with other key sectors, including heating, transportation, and gas. And this 
without mentioning the impact of distributed energy resources, energy storage facilities, 
and digitalization for a smarter and price-responsive demand. 
This major technology change has triggered a shift in the power sector’s cost structure, with 
an intensification of its capital costs at a time when variable costs are declining because of 
an expanded renewable energy supply (Bushnell and Novan 2018; Würzburg et al. 2013; 
Sensfuß et al. 2008). As a result, current electricity pricing systems are proving inadequate 
to guarantee fixed-cost recovery. Typically, most countries operate a two-part tariff (TPT) 
which, in theory, should consist of two price components: a volumetric charge equal to the 
marginal cost, which ensures allocative efficiency, and a fixed fee equal to the consumer’s 
share of fixed costs, which guarantees fixed-cost recovery (Coase 1946). In practice, 
however, fixed charges in electricity bills have tended to be low, while fixed costs have 
been largely covered by markups on the volumetric price component. Moreover, the rapid 
emergence of more energy-efficient appliances has further reduced the electricity industry’s 
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revenues. In many countries, utilities and policymakers have responded by attempting to 
allocate more fixed costs among the electricity bills’ fixed charges.1  
This is the case in at least 34 US states, where electric utilities have proposed shifting cost 
recovery from the volumetric component price to the fixed-part component (Wood et al. 
2016); in 14 states, the proposed fixed charge increase was more than 100% (Whited et al. 
2016). From a non-exhaustive list of 87 US electric utilities, the proposed increase in the 
customer charge (fixed part fee) was 61% (Baatz 2017). In a similar vein, the European 
Commission (2015) has called for more efficient electricity tariffs by increasing the share 
of fixed costs covered by fixed-charge price components. Only the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Spain have substantial fixed-price components, financing more than 75% of the 
industry’s fixed costs (Eurelectric 2016), and in the case of the Netherlands and Spain, this 
was due to reforms introduced in 2009 and 2013, respectively. Italy implemented similar 
reforms in 2016 (Chiaroni et al. 2017). Finally, Australia introduced new tariff structure 
rules in 2014 and, despite the flexibility shown by electricity utilities in adapting to their 
network and customer characteristics, the trend has been to increase fixed charges while 
lowering volumetric charges (Australian Energy Regulator 2016). 
Recent studies have shown the extent to which households respond to marginal prices in 
non-linear price schedules, usually in the context of increasing block pricing (Ito 2014; 
Khan and Wolak 2013; Nataraj and Hanemann 2010; Borenstein 2009). In the case of 
electricity, because of the information cost of understanding non-linear pricing structures, 
there is evidence that consumers tend to respond to average prices rather than to marginal 
prices; importantly, such non-optimizing behaviors are affected by their degree of energy 
literacy (Blasch et al. 2017; Jessoe and Rapson 2014; Wolak 2011). It remains unclear, 
however, how households might respond to changes in the pricing system when the price 
change is in the fixed price component, which, in contrast to changes in pricing blocks, is 
                                                             
 
1 By fixed charges, we refer to all non-volumetric price components of the electricity tariff, excluding taxes and any commercialization 
rates. However, fixed charges are defined differently across countries: in some, they are known as a standing charge, service charge, 
customer charge, connection charge, etc. and are usually charged as a fixed amount per day/month/year; e.g., Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Ireland, Poland, Sweden, the UK, and the US. In other countries, the fixed charge corresponds to a fixed amount per contracted capacity 
load (€/kW), e.g. Finland, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Spain. Finally, another group of countries operated both  connection 
and capacity charges; e.g. Italy, France, and the Netherlands. There is a long tradition in economics devoted to the optimal tariff design in 
regulated sectors, and particularly in the electric utilities; see MIT Energy Initiative (2016). 
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totally independent of the kWh consumed and – more importantly – seeks cost recovery. A 
central assumption underpinning the TPT scheme is that consumers discriminate fixed costs 
from marginal costs. If they fail to do so, the price signals sent may well be distorted both 
in the short and the long run, affecting cost recovery, allocative efficiency, and investment 
decisions. In this paper, using a quasi-experimental design that exploits the major 2013 
electricity price reform in Spain, we estimate a demand model to empirically evaluate 
household responses to a rise in the fixed charge of the residential electricity bill. 
Ex-ante evidence shows that electricity consumption increases if the rise in the fixed charge 
is revenue-neutral, i.e. the fixed charge increase is combined with an offsetting reduction in 
the volumetric price component so that the average price suffers no change. Using a dataset 
from a US electric utility, Lazar (2013) finds that consumption would increase by 7% in 
this case. Baatz (2017) finds that a 100% revenue-neutral increase in the fixed charge 
results in a consumption increase of 3–9% in the short run (and 10–20% in the long run) in 
the US. Finally, Pearce and Harris (2007), also examining the US residential sector, provide 
further evidence for these results by showing how a revenue-neutral suppression of the 
fixed charge would result in a consumption reduction of 6.4% (as the marginal price 
increases). The findings of these ex-ante studies align with standard economic theory and 
conclude that consumers respond to marginal prices, which implies that they identify fixed 
charges as a separate cost. 
The only relevant ex-post evidence is reported in a study conducted by Ito and Zhang 
(2018), who analyze the effect of a recent reform involving the introduction of a TPT in 
China’s heating systems. Heating prices in China used to comprise just a fixed charge 
dependent solely on the dwelling size. The reform the authors analyze saw the introduction 
of a positive marginal price at the same time the existing fixed charge was reduced. In their 
quasi-experiment, they find that treated households reduced their heating usage by 20% in 
response to the reform. Therefore, they conclude that consumers distinguish between 
marginal and fixed costs, in line with the ex-ante evidence described above. However, for 
electricity demand in a developed country, our results point in the opposite direction. 
The pricing reform in Spain saw the fixed charge raised 112% with a non-revenue neutral 
reduction in the regulated volumetric part of 35% (while wholesale prices remained 
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relatively constant, as in Figure A1). Our identification strategy involves exploiting the data 
stratification method employed by the Spanish Household Budget Survey (HBS), which 
allows us to create a comparable control group that was unaffected by the reform. The 
principal result of a difference-in-differences model shows that, despite the marginal price 
reduction, households reduced their electricity consumption by 16% compared to those in 
the counterfactual scenario. This reduction in consumption is not consistent with a response 
to (declining) marginal prices, but rather to (increasing) average prices. Moreover, we note 
a 12% reduction in household electricity expenditure, meaning that revenue increase from 
the higher fixed charge was lower than the revenue loss from the resulting contraction in 
demand. By means of quantile regression, we also show that while the highest electricity 
consumers markedly reduced their electricity consumption, the lowest electricity consumers 
made much smaller reductions, even non-significantly different from zero at the bottom of 
the distribution; the reform was indeed regressive. 
These findings have far-reaching yet timely policy implications. First, we show that rather 
than improving fixed-cost recovery, a rise in fixed charge tends to push electric utilities 
ever closer to a “death spiral” (Costello and Hemphill 2014) while doing little to guarantee 
their financial sustainability. This is critical, given the transformation the power sector is 
undergoing and the important challenges it faces globally. From an environmental 
perspective, price signals matter, and final outcomes hinge on consumers’ (mis)perceptions 
of future pricing policies. Based on our robustness checks, we do not observe any 
significant differences between treated and control households in terms of their investments 
in new equipment/change of energy source, that is, the fall in demand is attributable to the 
reform. As discussed by Borenstein and Bushnell (2018), in the same way that low prices 
may encourage wasteful use (i.e. prices set below social marginal cost), excessively high 
prices can act as a barrier to a higher electrification of energy and transportation services. 
Indeed, our results seem to be consistent with this latter hypothesis.  
This paper is, as far as we are aware, the first empirical evaluation of consumer response in 
an advanced economy to a non-revenue-neutral increase in the fixed charge of electricity 
bills, a policy currently under consideration in many countries. The following section 
describes the electricity pricing reform implemented in Spain. Section II describes our data 
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and the natural experiment design. Section III presents the empirical analysis and results, 
and finally, Section IV concludes by discussing the main policy implications derived from 
the analysis.    
I. Electricity pricing reform: the Spanish case 
 Prior to the reform, Spanish residential electricity demand had been shrinking for a 
number of years, the result of a global tendency driven by more affordable energy-efficient 
home appliances, including the rapid emergence of LEDs (Davis 2017). Moreover, Spain 
had been hit hard by the 2008 global financial crisis, leading to a widespread reduction in 
consumption. This decline in demand impacted the revenue of electricity companies to such 
an extent that threatened the financial sustainability of the entire system. In response, an 
electricity pricing reform was introduced with the aim of achieving a “better balance 
between the pricing system and the industry’s cost structure” (Orden IET/1491/2013).  
The Spanish electricity bill comprises a TPT pricing that takes the following form:  
(1) 𝑝(𝑞) = [𝐹𝐸𝑘 + 𝑞(𝑓 + 𝑝))]𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 
The residential final price p(q) is the sum of a fixed charge corresponding to the contracted 
capacity load Ek (in kW), multiplied by the regulated charge F, and the variable part that 
depends on electricity consumed q (in kWh). This is split in two parts: a regulated access 
rate f and a market-based part p (wholesale price) on which the electricity tax (5%) and 
VAT (21%) are then levied. 
The reform we evaluate was implemented in August 2013 and led to a marked increase in 
the fixed charge part, F, the same time that f, a component of the variable part, was 
reduced. Thus, for electricity consumers with fewer than 10 kW of contracted capacity (that 
is, 94% of Spanish households), F increased by 112% while f decreased by 36%. For 
households with more than 10 kW of contracted capacity (just 6%), the reform was less 
dramatic. Figure 1 shows the evolution taken by the different price components described 
(see Figure A1 in the Appendix for further details on wholesale price evolution). 
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FIGURE 1. ELECTRICITY TARIFF COMPONENTS IN SPAIN 
Notes: Solid lines: fixed charge evolution. Dashed lines: the regulated variable part. Dotted line: wholesale price evolution (source: 
data are from Red Electrica de España). 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of both electricity consumption and expenditure in 26 two-
week periods throughout 2013, with a decoupling between the indicators following reform, 
expenditure somehow remaining constant despite the fall in demand. As such, a (naive) 
interpretation might be that the reform prevented further revenue loss despite continuing 
fall in demand. However, Figure 2 obviously does not show how the two variables would 
have evolved had reform not been implemented; that is, it does not illustrate the 
counterfactual scenario. Our identification strategy, detailed in the section that follows, 
allows us to estimate this counterfactual scenario and therefore measure the reform’s 
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FIGURE 2. EVOLUTION IN ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION AND EXPENDITURE IN 2013 
 
II. Data and research design 
A. Data 
 Data are taken, as indicated, from the Spanish HBS conducted by the Spanish 
statistics office, Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). This high-quality survey reports 
annual data at the household level for the period of 2006-2016 on the physical quantity of 
consumption of certain goods and their corresponding expenditure, including electricity 
billing data. Given that we seek to determine the impact of the 2013 reform, we limit our 
sample to the period of 2011-2014 to guarantee that no other significant events affect our 
data. Specifically, we use data from households interviewed between August 2011 and 
April 2014.2 Participation in the survey is limited to two years, and only half of each year’s 
cohort is (randomly) invited to participate the second year. Our sample comprises a panel 
                                                             
 



























of 25,775 observations, and we exploit both its panel data structure and cross-sectional 
dimensions.  
B. Identification strategy 
 Natural experiments have become the gold standard for making causal inferences in 
the social sciences, above all in policy evaluation. Yet one of the main challenges that must 
be faced is that non-experimental data do not always provide a clean control group. Ideally, 
researchers would work on two randomly assigned samples, only one of which would be 
exposed to reform (treated group). Only under such conditions can the causal effects of the 
reform be unequivocally identified. Here, however, all Spanish households are exposed to 
the same electricity pricing and hence impacted by the same reform shock. As is usual, 
microdata are gathered on a yearly basis, which means the policy impact is easily 
confounded with other, often unobservable, factors, making it virtually impossible to 
separate the policy effect from these confounders. Our research design addresses this 
identification problem by exploiting existing discontinuities in fixed-part price variation at 
different interview dates. The sample design of the Spanish HBS is stratified in such a way 
that it provides identical groups of households across different rounds of interviewing. This 
means these groups are identical except for the interview date. 
The INE collects information by means of interviews conducted over two-week periods, 
during which all goods and services consumed are recorded, including any electricity bills. 
The INE then converts this fortnightly consumer data to yearly data. Sampling is stratified 
across 26 two-week periods of every year, which means we exploit 26 homogenous 
subsamples per year in defining our control and treated groups—that is, households whose 
electricity bills fall under the reform can be separated from those whose bills are unaffected 
by the reform. The key to our identification strategy is that a household’s second interview 
is held in the same two-week period of the year as that of the interview conducted in its first 
year of participation; i.e., if household i was interviewed in the first two-week period of 
April in year t, it will be interviewed again in the same two-week period in t+1. Figure 3 





FIGURE 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Notes: The figure shows the sample design of the Spanish HBS across the years sampled. Each circle represents a household interviewed 
twice, once each year, and both conducted in the same period. Continuous circles correspond to households in the treated group 
(households whose second interview was conducted later than August 2013), whereas dashed circles correspond to those in the control 
group (households for whom both interviews were conducted prior to the reform in August 2013).  
 
In the first step, we distinguish the households whose two annual interviews occurred pre-
reform (control group) from those whose second interview occurred post-reform (treated 
group). Let D be a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the treated households such that: 
(2) 
𝐷 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖1 < 𝑖2 < 𝑅
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖1 < 𝑅 < 𝑖2
 
where i1 is the first interview date, i2 is the second interview date, and R is the date of the 
reform (i.e. August 1, 2013). Then T, a subset of D, is a post-reform dummy that identifies 
interviews conducted after the introduction of the reform. That is,  
(3) 
𝑇 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖2 < 𝑅
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖2 > 𝑅
 
Thus, while D allows us to identify the treated and control household groups, T is the main 
variable capturing the effect of the reform. If qi0 denotes the amount of electricity 
consumed by household i when T = 0, and qi1 denotes the amount consumed when T = 1, 
then we assume that 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞0𝑖 + 𝑇(𝑞1𝑖 − 𝑞0𝑖). The key here lies in the assumption of a 
sampling balance between the treated and control groups prior to the reform, which, in our 
case, is guaranteed by the sample design. Table 1 shows the summary statistics by control 
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and treatment groups. Figure 4 compares the empirical distribution of control (D = 0) and 
treated (D = 1) households before the reform in relation to a number of key variables. 
Given that households appear to be similar in both pre-reform subsamples, assignment to 
the treatment group would appear to be independent of their observable characteristics, 
including potential outcome. The only confounding differences are those that may arise 
from different weather conditions the households faced in the month of the interview. 
However, since weather is a function of geographical location and time, we use regional 
and quarterly dummies to control for its potential confounding effects. Hence, conditional 
on pre-reform observable characteristics, assignment to the treatment group appears to be 
as good as random assignment. In short, the conditional independence assumption seems 
plausible here. 
 
 TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Full sample 
 
Control Group 
(D = 0)  
Treated Group 
(D = 1) 
Variable Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
From August 2011 to April 2014 
 
          




















Total expenditure (€) 22,801 14,739  22,889 14,745  22,660 14,727 




















































































FIGURE 4. QQ-PLOT COMPARING COVARIATES PRE-REFORM 
Notes: The panels show the empirical quantile-quantile plot for the quantiles of the control group; that is, households whose two 
interviews were conducted before the reform was implemented (D = 0) vs. the quantiles for the treated group corresponding to their first 
interview (D = 1). 
 
C. Empirical model 
 Our baseline specification for estimating the average treatment effect (ATE) of the 
reform takes the form of a structural demand model: 
(4)   ln(𝑞𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼 + 𝛽 ln(𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽 ln(𝑦𝑖𝑡) +  𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  
where ln(qit) measures the natural log of kWh consumed by household i in year t, ln(pit) 
measures the natural log of total kWh price (including all taxes), and ln(yit) measures 
income. X is a set of relevant socioeconomic controls (age, household size, education level, 
region, etc.), including a quarterly dummy to control for any potential stationary effects. 𝜃𝑖 
and 𝜑𝑡 are the household and the year-fixed effects, respectively, and εit is the error term. 
We further cluster standard errors at the household level. T is our post-reform treatment 
variable.  
The coefficient δ measures the average effect of the reform. More formally, 𝛿 =
(𝑞0𝑡 − 𝑞0𝑡−1) − (𝑞1𝑡 − 𝑞1𝑡−1), a difference-in-differences estimator. Given the quasi-
experimental setting, the policy change is systematically unrelated to other factors that may 
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We complement the analysis with a quantile regression model (Koenker and Basset 1978) 
to assess the reform’s distributional impact, an issue particularly relevant to electricity 
consumption. Given the φ-quantile linear distribution of qi conditioned on X and T:  
(5) 𝑄𝜑(𝑞|𝑇, 𝑋) =  𝛼𝜑𝑇 + 𝑋′𝛽𝜑 
The quantile regression estimator consists then of solving: 
(6)         (𝛼𝜑 , 𝛽𝜑 ) = min
𝛼,𝛽
[𝜌𝜑(𝑞 − 𝛼𝑇 − 𝑋
′𝛽)] 
where 𝜌𝜑 = (𝜑 − 1)𝜆 for 𝜆 < 0. Therefore, 𝛼𝜑 is the treatment effect in the φ-quantile. 
The model is estimated with bootstrap standard errors. 
  
III. Empirical analysis and results  
A. Average effect 
 Table 2 reports the main electricity demand function estimates in which models 1 
and 2 use household electricity consumption as the dependent variable, and models 3 and 4 
use household electricity expenditure. The ATE corresponds to the coefficient δ of the 
treatment variable T that can be read as the percentage change in household electricity 
consumption/expenditure due to the reform. Since households receive their electricity bills 
at the end of the billing period (one month) and do not usually have access to daily 
information about their consumption or prices, the actual response to the reform should be 
registered one month after it was introduced. In this respect, the treated households 
correspond to those that receive, for a second time, a reformed electricity bill. The models 
are estimated by OLS (columns 1 and 3) and by LSDV (columns 2 and 4) so as to take into 
account the household fixed effects. All regressions are controlled for several relevant 
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socioeconomic variables3 and for quarterly dummies to control for potential stationarity 
issues. 
The treatment coefficient is significant and negative in all specifications. According to the 
OLS specifications (column 1), treated households reduced their electricity consumption by 
about 18%. When unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for (column 2), the ATE is a 15% 
reduction. Therefore, despite the reduction in the volumetric rate, when the fixed charge is 
raised, households respond by reducing their electricity consumption. This first result is in 
line with studies conducted elsewhere that find that consumers react to average prices 
rather than to marginal prices (Ito 2014). Were consumers to respond to marginal prices, 
consumption would increase since, in contrast to the average price, the volumetric rate fell 
(because of the reform itself and because of wholesale prices; see Figure A1). This means 
consumers use electricity at a level lower than that expected from a TPT scheme, with 
lower allocative efficiency.   
TABLE 2. EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION AND EXPENDITURE (2011–2014). 
















(0.027) (0.028)  (0.027) (0.028) 




(0.024) (0.025)  (0.025) (0.025) 




(0.075) (0.120)  (0.075) (0.120) 




(0.008) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.012) 




(0.008) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.009) 




(0.245) (0.358)  (0.245) (0.358) 
Household fixed effects No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 20,872 20,872  20,872 20,872 
R-squared 0.295 0.177  0.189 0.024 
R2 adj. 0.293 0.176  0.188 0.0231 
Number of id   10,729    10,729 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
                                                             
 
3 Specifications without controls have also been considered, but are not shown here, as the results are virtually identical. Models with 




Columns 3 and 4 provide the results for household electricity expenditure and thus illustrate 
whether the reform’s main (revenue) objective is met. Here, the coefficients are also 
negative, albeit slightly smaller than those for consumption: When fixed effects are taken 
into account, households reduce expenditure by 10% (compared to the 15% reduction in 
consumption). This suggests that, despite the fixed charge increase and because consumers 
fail to respond to marginal prices, the reduction in consumption drags electricity 
expenditure down with respect to the pre-reform situation, as the increase in the fixed 
charge fails to compensate for the revenue loss associated with the contraction in demand. 
An alternative explanation may lie with changes in contracted load capacities. Since fixed 
charges are linked to these contracted loads, households may have reacted to the reform by 
reducing their load capacities in order to cut their electricity bills. The available data do not 
allow us to test this hypothesis; however, while a reaction along these lines might be 
expected, according to Spain’s energy regulator (CNMC, 2015), the average contracted 
load capacity did not change significantly in the sampled period (see Figure A3).4 Yet, even 
if there had been a reduction in load capacities, this would fail to explain the significant 
reduction in electricity consumption unless the change in contracted load capacity was 
associated with increased investment in more efficient appliances (ruled out, as indicated, 
by our robustness checks) or with a radical change in habits.   
These results are robust to different specifications and control variables; however, since the 
identification strategy depends on the interview date – as do the other controls, including 
distance from the reform and the quarterly dummies – Table 3 complements the previous 
results by limiting the sample to that of the year of reform itself, i.e. 2013. By so doing, we 
compare annual household consumption (expenditure) within the same year, and other 
regulatory or economic confounding events are ruled out. Different specifications are 
shown and, in this case, we cluster standard errors at the two-week period. Results remain 
consistent with the panel data estimation, albeit with a lower magnitude due to the smaller 
                                                             
 
4 The CNMC periodically publishes the monthly average contracted load capacity. Figure A3 in the Appendix shows that the evolution of 
the average contracted capacity and the change in contracted capacities is not significant enough to explain the reduction observed. 
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sample size, as well as the lower number of treated households (those treated in 2014 are 
not considered). Yet, this cross-sectional evidence can be read in terms of the short-run 
effect of the reform, while higher panel data coefficients, insofar as they come from a 
within estimator, may be interpreted as the reform’s long-run effect. 
TABLE 3. EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION (2013). 



















































(0.023) (0.365)  (0.021) (0.356) 
Controls No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Observations 18,770 14,894  18,770 14,894 
R-squared 0.004 0.289  0.002 0.182 
R2 adj. 0.00430 0.287  0.00215 0.180 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
  B. Distributional effects 
 The impact of an increase in the fixed-price component is, necessarily, 
heterogeneous across households and more specifically tends to be regressive. In the case 
of US residential natural gas, Borenstein and Davis (2012) show that a similar reform 
would be regressive, although financing fixed costs through markups of the volumetric rate 
was only mildly progressive because of the correlation between gas consumption and 
income. In their study of heating-price reform in China, Ito and Zhang (2018) also find that 
moving from a plain tariff to a TPT was regressive; however, this is in part explained by the 
particular ex-ante situation where the plain tariff was a function of household dwelling size 
(and therefore progressive). In this section, we analyze the distributional incidence of the 
Spanish reform across households. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results obtained when applying a quantile regression model (with 
bootstrapped standard errors) for consumption and expenditure, respectively. More 
specifically, they show the effects of the reform conditional on the deciles of electricity 
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consumption. Since the coefficients in a quantile regression are not controlled by 
unobserved heterogeneity (as they are in the fixed effect model), the coefficients shown 
underestimate the actual impact, presumably in a similar way to the OLS estimations 
above. 
TABLE 4. QUANTILE REGRESSION ON ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION (2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90 
Reform (T) 0.006 −0.056*** −0.054*** −0.082*** −0.095*** −0.119*** −0.135*** −0.155*** −0.169*** 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) 
ln(price kWh) −0.946*** −1.082*** −1.136*** −1.168*** −1.168*** −1.159*** −1.168*** −1.192*** −1.184*** 
 
(0.049) (0.044) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.036) (0.042) (0.041) (0.045) 
ln(income) 0.560** 0.443*** 0.456*** 0.344** 0.203 0.204 0.213* 0.136 0.080 
 
(0.187) (0.120) (0.109) (0.126) (0.118) (0.115) (0.088) (0.125) (0.128) 
ln(income)2 −0.044* −0.032** −0.034** −0.023 −0.007 −0.008 −0.009 −0.003 0.005 
 
(0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant −0.840 −1.231*** −1.462*** −1.258*** −0.846* −0.653 −0.564 −0.330 0.002 
 
(0.535) (0.366) (0.303) (0.366) (0.364) (0.419) (0.356) (0.399) (0.433) 
Observations 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
TABLE 5. QUANTILE REGRESSION ON ELECTRICITY EXPENDITURE (2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90 
Reform (T) 0.024 −0.037* −0.039** −0.061*** −0.080*** −0.098*** −0.115*** −0.143*** −0.148*** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.022) 
ln(price kWh) 0.053 −0.090* −0.148*** −0.171*** −0.167*** −0.173*** −0.181*** −0.208*** −0.215*** 
 
(0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.030) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.038) (0.046) 
ln(income) 0.611*** 0.432*** 0.463*** 0.360*** 0.224** 0.220** 0.208** 0.152 0.172 
 
(0.172) (0.120) (0.109) (0.093) (0.085) (0.080) (0.077) (0.107) (0.136) 
ln(income)2 −0.049** −0.031* −0.035** −0.024* −0.010 −0.010 −0.009 −0.004 −0.006 
 
(0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) 
Constant 4.027*** 3.750*** 3.446*** 3.690*** 4.119*** 4.234*** 4.387*** 4.547*** 4.604*** 
 
(0.490) (0.404) (0.349) (0.299) (0.263) (0.302) (0.265) (0.369) (0.452) 
Observations 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 14,894 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
The conditional median estimate coincides very closely with the conditional mean 
estimates reported in Table 3. The ATE estimate therefore provides a good measure of the 
central location of the distribution (a 9.6% reduction for consumption and an 8% reduction 
for expenditure). However, the remaining conditional quantiles are statistically different 
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from the average effect. Figure 5 further shows that the effect of the reform differs 
markedly across deciles: While the top deciles respond much more markedly than average, 
the bottom deciles respond very little or even fail to react at all (the latter being the case for 
the decile at the very bottom, 0.10). The top decile (0.90) reacted to the reform by reducing 
electricity consumption by as much as 17%.  
 
FIGURE 5. REFORM EFFECT BY QUANTILES OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION AND EXPENDITURE. 
 
Two caveats should, however, be noted when interpreting the results for the extreme 
deciles. First, for households with more than 10 kW of contracted capacity (5.9%), 
ostensibly the highest electricity consumers, the fixed-part increase was 25%, which was 
much lower than for the rest of the households. This discontinuity in the treatment could 
have affected the estimated impact in the top deciles. Second, at the time of the reform, 
about 10% of Spanish households were entitled to a social bonus program providing for a 
25% reduction in their electricity bills when they met at least one of the program’s 
conditions. Of the households entitled to the social bonus, 81% meet the conditions on the 
grounds that they contract the low capacity charge (less than 3 kW). Other conditions 
include unemployment, different categories of disability, and large families. These 
households are among the lowest electricity consumers, which means that our estimation 
for this bottom decile may be confounded by this policy. Since we observe neither 
























these potential confounders. Fortunately, however, these characteristics are limited to the 
extreme deciles and do not prevent us from observing the heterogeneity of the reform’s 
impact on different electricity consumption profiles.  
Interestingly, however, and as reported by Borenstein and Davis (2012), household 
electricity consumption and household income are only weakly correlated (Figure A4), so 
impact on consumption levels does not necessarily correspond to impact on income levels.5 
To measure the reform’s distributional incidence, Figure 6 shows the relative burden of 
electricity expenditure (as measured by the median) across income levels for the time 
period covered by our analysis. The steep decline across income deciles suggests that 
electricity price increases, such as those introduced by the 2013 Spanish reform, have 
regressive effects.  
 
FIGURE 6. ELECTRICITY EXPENDITURE AS A SHARE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE. 
 
To unambiguously quantify the reform’s degree of implicit regressivity, we compute the 
two progressivity indices proposed by Suits (1977) and Kakwani (1977) for both treated 
and control households. We do so by computing Gini indices and concentration curves of 
                                                             
 
5 Table A2 in the Appendix shows a specification in which the reform interacts with income and this results in not being statistically 























































electricity expenditure and total household expenditure (Sterner 2012; Sahn and Younger 
2003). Both indices show negative signs, suggesting the reform was regressive (Table 6).   
 
TABLE 6. KAWKANI AND SUITS INDICES FOR ELECTRICITY EXPENDITURE BEFORE AND AFTER THE REFORM 
  T = 0 T = 1 
Kawkani progressivity index −0.2247 −0.2305 
Suits progressivity index −0.2268 −0.2332 
 
 
C. Robustness checks 
 In order to examine the robustness of the above estimates, we conduct two 
additional analyses: First, we test that the results are indeed driven by the reform and not by 
potential confounders, such as changes in home appliances or switching energy sources. By 
controlling for these factors, we can see the extent to which our core estimates are driven 
by exogenous technology changes or by the reform itself. Second, we perform a 
falsification test by estimating placebo reforms. These are also estimated by means of a 
non-parametric method (matching estimator) so that we test our results using a different 
methodology. 
As shown in the previous section, our results are robust to different specifications and time 
spans. However, in recent years, not only have home appliances become more energy-
efficient, but new labeling regulations have made this information more readily available to 
consumers who are better placed to optimize energy-saving investments. To ensure that our 
estimates are not being confounded by this technology trend, Table 7 includes additional 
controls covariates related to household investment in new home appliances, particularly 
investments in (i) all kinds of home appliances, (ii) small electric appliances such as bulbs, 
and (iii) changes in the heating or water boiler. Compared to our core estimations, the 
reform coefficient remains virtually unchanged; the panel data model in column 1 shows 
that the reform coefficient remains at −16%, although this estimate is only significant at the 
0.1 level. For cross-sectional models, results remain at −9%, as for the previous 
specifications. Investment in home appliances does, however, show a significant impact on 
electricity consumption (columns 2 and 3), albeit with a positive impact on electricity 
demand. 
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TABLE 7. EFFECT OF REFORM WHEN CONTROLLING FOR HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT IN DIFFERENT HOME APPLIANCES 








Reform (T) −0.164 −0.0899** −0.0985** 
 
(0.0899) (0.0310) (0.0314) 
ln(price kWh) −0.999*** −1.238*** −1.166*** 
 
(0.0731) (0.0654) (0.0975) 
ln(income) 0.437 0.123 0.161 
 
(0.338) (0.109) (0.274) 
ln(income)2 −0.0368 0.00331 0.00286 
 
(0.0349) (0.0110) (0.0274) 
ln(investment home appliances) 0.00716 0.0148*** 0.0162** 
 
(0.00503) (0.00384) (0.00514) 
ln(investment bulbs & other) 0.00301 −0.00149 −0.00182 
 
(0.00361) (0.00244) (0.00330) 
Change energy source water boiler (= 1) 
  
0.0589 
   
(0.0656) 
Change energy source heating (= 1) 
  
0.0695 
   
(0.0477) 
Constant 0.296 −0.754 −0.479 
 
(0.948) (0.530) (0.826) 
Year FE Yes No No 
Household FE Yes No No 
Observations 5,595 3,888 1,653 
R-squared 0.159 0.181 0.199 
Number of id 4,415 
  Controls NO NO NO 
R2 adj. 0.158 0.180 0.195 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
   
Second, our falsification test involves the introduction of a placebo reform in the same 
period, but one year earlier. This means that treated and control households are once again 
allocated in relation to the week they were interviewed, but this time as if the reform had 
occurred one year earlier, in August 2012 as opposed to August 2013. No other reform 
measures were adopted at that time that might have confounded our placebo estimates. 
Table 8 shows the coefficients of the placebo reform for consumption and expenditure in 
columns 1 and 2, respectively (columns 3 and 4 show previous results for the sake of 
comparison). The placebo coefficient is non-significant in the case of consumption, 
confirming the estimated effect of the reform. In contrast, in the case of electricity 
expenditure, the coefficient shows a significant positive sign that can only be driven by the 





TABLE 8. PLACEBO REFORM REGRESSION ESTIMATES COMPARED WITH THOSE OF ACTUAL REFORM 


















   
(0.024) (0.022) 
ln(price kWh) −1.124*** −0.115* −1.093*** −0.102 
 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.054) (0.051) 
ln(income) 0.399** 0.398** 0.339** 0.337** 
 
(0.117) (0.118) (0.091) (0.091) 
ln(income) x ln(income) −0.028* −0.028* −0.022* −0.022* 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant −0.846 4.182*** −0.632 4.321*** 
 
(0.415) (0.427) (0.365) (0.356) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,705 14,705 14,894 14,894 
R-squared 0.293 0.186 0.289 0.182 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05  
     
We performed further falsification tests using a matching estimator based on the 
Mahalanobis distances (calculated with relevant covariates) between treated and control 
groups (Table 9). After ensuring both the real treatment and placebo samples are well 
balanced (Table A4, Appendix) and therefore comparable, the non-significance of the 
placebo reform further confirms our results: The reform caused a contraction in demand.6 
 















Placebo reform  
  
−0.011 0.0784*** 
   
(0.0168) (0.0165) 
Estimator  Nearest N. Nearest N. Nearest N. Nearest N. 
Matches requested 10 10 10 10 
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis 
Sample 2013 2013 2012 2012 
Observations 8,185 8,185 7,208 7,208 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05  
    
                                                             
 
6 Chetty et al. (2009) show how tax salience has an impact on consumer demand: The more salient the tax, the more consumer demand 
overreacts. In Spain, electricity prices have been historically salient for various political and economic reasons. A simple Google Trends 
search using the words “factura de la luz” (electricity bill), “luz” (electricity), “ahorro factura de la luz” (savings on electricity bill), and 
any other suggestions provided by the Google algorithm shows how these search queries increased significantly, peaking just a fter the 
August 2013 reform. Indeed, if we include households that paid the first “reformed” electricity bill in the treated group (recall our treated 
group in the analysis includes those households that received a second reformed bill), the OLS coefficient is 0.119 (vs. 0.178 as reported 
in Table 2). This difference in coefficients can be attributed to the different salience acquired by electricity prices immediately after the 
reform. Further research is needed to disentangle the particular drivers of potential behavioral responses.  
 22 
Coefficients remain consistent across the different model specifications and methods. 
Hence, based on the quasi-experimental research design applied to a structural demand 
model in a highly representative population sample, our robustness checks confirm that the 
reform led to a reduction in electricity demand that ended up reducing electricity 
expenditure (and thus negatively affecting the industry’s cost recovery efforts). 
 
 
IV. Conclusion and discussion 
 Full cost recovery is critical to ensure reliable and sustainable electricity supplies, 
and moreover, it is a principle that underpins electricity tariff setting. As the power sector 
has been subject to major transformations in recent years, increasing the share of fixed 
costs recovered through the fixed charge to consumers via their electricity bill – as opposed 
to markups at the volumetric rate – has become commonplace on regulatory agendas in 
many countries. In this paper, we have shown that, owing to household misperceptions of 
true marginal costs, electricity industry revenues do not rise as expected following an 
increase in the fixed charge. Using the data collection method employed by the HBS to 
analyze the 2013 major Spanish electricity reform, we find quasi-experimental evidence 
that, despite a decrease in the marginal price, households reduce their electricity 
consumption when faced with an increase in the fixed charge on their electricity bill. This 
strongly suggests that consumers fail to discriminate between marginal and fixed costs and 
thus optimize consumption at the average price rather than the marginal price. This result 
has timely and far-reaching policy implications for upcoming reforms to electricity price 
settings. 
First, suboptimal behavior of this type results in lower electricity expenditure, which in turn 
significantly undermines fixed-cost recovery. To the extent that consumers react to a 
(higher) average price, as opposed to a (lower) marginal price, the reduction in 
consumption cuts household expenditure to the point that the revenues raised from the 
higher fixed charge may fail to offset the revenue loss from the contraction in electricity 
demand. The Spanish electricity industry actually ended up in a worse financial situation 
than if the reform had not been introduced. 
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An alternative hypothesis that we unfortunately cannot test directly is that households 
responded to the reform by adapting their contracted load capacity, and therefore reduced 
their electricity expenditure. However, according to the statistics published by the Spanish 
energy regulator, the average load capacity did not change significantly following the 
reform. In any case, although in theory electricity expenditure could have fallen because of 
changing capacities, this would not explain the sizeable reduction observed in electricity 
consumption unless the capacity reduction was linked to radical changes in consumption 
habits or to a reduction in household energy needs—that is, to an investment in more 
efficient appliances. Our robustness checks discarded this possibility. 
Second, the impact of a reform of this kind is heterogeneous across households 
and electricity price increases brought about by a rise in the fixed-change component are 
regressive, in line with the general findings of the literature. Moreover, a quantile 
regression shows that the highest electricity consumers reduce their electricity consumption 
and expenditure the most, while the lowest electricity consumers fail to respond at all.  
Third, allocative efficiency, the other ultimate aim of a TPT scheme, is not achieved as 
consumer misperceptions of the fixed price component result in their reacting to a higher 
average price rather than to the true marginal price. As a result, electricity consumption is 
lower than it would have been had consumers reacted to the marginal price. From a climate 
policy perspective, this lower level of consumption can be considered a positive side effect, 
as it reduces energy-related emissions. From a welfare perspective, however, this is positive 
only if the pre-existing electricity price was below its social marginal cost and thus the 
reform implicitly solves this issue (thanks to consumer misperceptions). If the resulting 
price signal is higher than the social marginal cost, this would entail a lower-than-optimal 
electricity use.  
Overall, we find robust evidence that the reform led to a reduction in residential electricity 
demand. Given our quasi-experimental research design, applied here in a structural model, 
and the representativeness of our sample, the policy implications identified are clearly not 
limited to Spain and should be of interest to those about to undertake similar reforms. Yet, 
a number of key research questions remain unanswered by our analysis: Most specifically, 
why it is that consumers fail to identify marginal costs. A potential hypothesis – and one 
 24 
confirmed by the literature – is that of imperfect information: First, in relation to prices, as 
non-linear tariffs are complex and require considerable cognitive effort to be understood; 
and second, in relation to quantities, as most consumers are unable to track their cumulative 
electricity consumption during the billing period.  
A further potential driver that may help explain our results is the salience of the reform 
itself. It is well established in the literature that, in the case of gasoline, the salience of new 
taxes can have its own impact on demand, regardless of actual prices (Rivers and Schaufele 
2015; Li, Linn, and Muehlegger 2014; Davis and Killian 2011). Likewise, tax persistence 
compared to market prices also has an impact on demand (Tiezzi and Verde 2018; Davis 
and Killian 2011). Both salience and persistence result in a significantly greater impact on 
demand than is otherwise expected from market price elasticities; however, little research 
has been conducted to date on these issues in the case of the electricity market, with the 
sole exception of Gilbert and Zivin (2014). It could be that both salience and persistence 
reinforced the demand response identified here. In all circumstances, correcting imperfect 
information at the household level would undoubtedly improve market efficiency in both 
the short and long run. Indeed, climate stability could well depend on it. 
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FIGURE A1. WHOLE SALE PRICE EVOLUTION IN SPAIN 























































































































































































FIGURE A3. EVOLUTION OF THE AVERAGE CONTRACTED CAPACITY LOAD 
 Notes: These average contracted capacity loads correspond to total average capacity of regulated and liberalized markets. This 
is virtually equivalent to contracted capacities in tariffs 2.0A that make above 90% of consumers. (Data taken from Boletín de 






































































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE A4. ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
Notes: Graph shows correlation between household electricity consumption and equivalent adult income. 
TABLE A2. EFFECTS ON ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION AND EXPENDITURE. SPECIFICATIONS WITH INTERACTIONS (NO CONTROLS). 2011–2014  



















Reform (T) −0.199*** −0.703 −0.165*** −0.212 −0.177*** −0.680 −0.109*** −0.180 
 
(0.026) (0.467) (0.025) (0.454) (0.026) (0.467) (0.025) (0.454) 










(0.049)   (0.051) 
 
(0.049) 










(0.140)   (0.140) 
 
(0.139) 
ln(income) 0.194** 0.166* 0.212* 0.225* 0.190** 0.162* 0.213* 0.225* 
 
(0.068) (0.075) (0.095) (0.099) (0.068) (0.075) (0.095) (0.099) 
ln(price kWh) −1.186*** −1.184*** −1.026*** −1.021*** −0.191*** −0.189*** −0.027 −0.021 
 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
ln(income)2 0.003 0.006 −0.018 
 
0.003 0.006 −0.018 
 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
 
Distance to T 0.021** 0.021** 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.009 −0.016* −0.015 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant −0.673** −0.595* 0.724** 0.734** 4.208*** 4.286*** 5.643*** 5.656*** 
 
(0.215) (0.234) (0.269) (0.280) (0.215) (0.234) (0.269) (0.280) 
Observations 25,613 25,613 25,613 25,613 25,613 25,613 25,613 25,613 
R-squared 0.203 0.203 0.175 0.175 0.080 0.080 0.025 0.025 
Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
R2 adj. 0.203 0.202 0.175 0.175 0.0794 0.0793 0.0243 0.0243 
Number of id     12,868 12,868     12,868 12,868 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 





























TABLE A3. SPECIFICATIONS WITH INCOME QUINTILE INTERACTIONS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES lnc_ele lnc_ele lng_ele lng_ele 
Reform (T) 0.0664* −0.1589*** 0.0855** −0.1029** 
 
(0.0274) (0.0383) (0.0260) (0.0383) 
(T = 0) x quintile 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
(T = 0) x quintile 2 0.0472** 0.0182 0.0477** 0.0186 
 
(0.0142) (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0160) 
(T = 0) x quintile 3 0.1068*** 0.0001 0.1072*** 0.0001 
 
(0.0141) (0.0177) (0.0142) (0.0177) 
(T = 0) x quintile 4 0.1257*** −0.0088 0.1260*** −0.0081 
 
(0.0112) (0.0196) (0.0112) (0.0196) 
(T = 0) x quintile 5 0.1467*** −0.0098 0.1466*** −0.0092 
 
(0.0137) (0.0227) (0.0136) (0.0227) 
(T = 1) x quintile 1 −0.2009*** −0.0021 −0.2013*** −0.0027 
 
(0.0365) (0.0320) (0.0375) (0.0320) 
(T = 1) x quintile 2 −0.1196*** 0.0072 −0.1208*** 0.0065 
 
(0.0267) (0.0290) (0.0273) (0.0290) 
(T = 1) x quintile 3 −0.0390* −0.0086 −0.0402* −0.0089 
 
(0.0162) (0.0277) (0.0157) (0.0277) 
(T = 1) x quintile 4 −0.0303 0.0101 −0.0329 0.0095 
 
(0.0190) (0.0276) (0.0197) (0.0275) 
ln(price kWh) −1.0935*** −1.0293*** −0.1027 −0.0300 
 
(0.0543) (0.0250) (0.0519) (0.0250) 
Constant 0.3203 1.1152*** 5.2659*** 6.0341*** 
 
(0.3549) (0.2081) (0.3382) (0.2080) 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Household fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,963 20,959 14,963 20,959 
R-squared 0.2848 0.1780 0.1768 0.0238 
R2 adj. 0.283 0.177 0.174 0.0226 
Number of id   10,745   10,745 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 













TABLE A4. PLACEBO TEST BALANCE 
  Reform Sample 2013 Placebo Sample 2012 
Variable n Mean S.D. n Mean S.D. 
Electricity consumption 18770             3,272.9                2,005.1    18394           3,598.1              2,207.9    
Electricity expenditure 18770                730.5                   408.4    18394              761.7                 430.6    
Income  18624           23,358.0              15,063.5    18291         23,669.2            14,561.2    
Total expenditure  18770           28,746.0              16,735.0    18394         29,690.7            17,189.9    
Education level 18770                    2.6                       1.1    18394                  2.6                     1.1    
Household economic situation  15270                    1.8                       0.9    15031                  1.8                     0.9    
Household social situation 18763                    3.2                       1.7    18391                  3.2                     1.7    
Number household members 18770                    2.8                       1.3    18394                  2.8                     1.3    
Elderly 18770                    0.3                       0.5    18394                  0.3                     0.5    
Retired pension 18705                    0.4                       0.5    18367                  0.4                     0.5    
Number of rooms 18769                    5.2                       1.2    18384                  5.2                     1.2    
House surface 18385                104.0                     47.2    18032              104.1                   47.2    
Capital of province 18770                    0.3                       0.5    18394                  0.3                     0.5    
Autonomous region 18770                    9.0                       5.0    18394                  9.0                     5.0    
Town size 18770                    2.7                       1.6    18394                  2.7                     1.6    
Population density 18770                    1.8                       0.9    18394                  1.8                     0.9    
Tenure 18770                    0.1                       0.3    18394                  0.1                     0.3    
Urban-rural 18770                    0.8                       0.4    18394                  0.8                     0.4    
Old building (25+ years) 18760                    0.6                       0.5    18384                  0.6                     0.5    
Interview date 18770                  12.4                       7.1    18394                12.4                     7.1    
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